Philosophy of Mind MCQs (Set-4)

What is a classic challenge to type identity theory?

A The problem of other minds
B The Turing test
C The cogito
D Multiple realizability

Why does multiple realizability favor functionalism?

A Roles can have varied realizers
B Brains never cause behavior
C Minds lack any function
D Physical states are unreal

What is the systems reply to Searle’s argument?

A The operator understands Chinese
B The whole system understands
C Rules create consciousness
D The room is a brain

What does Searle’s robot reply add?

A A larger rulebook
B A second operator
C Perception and action links
D A perfect memory

What is the central claim of Searle’s argument?

A Brains cannot cause minds
B Machines cannot process symbols
C Behavior never reveals beliefs
D Syntax alone is not semantics

What does Nagel’s bat example highlight?

A Subjective character of experience
B Animals lack all sensation
C Brains are immaterial
D Behavior is always deceptive

What is one reply to Mary’s knowledge argument?

A A new color law
B She gains an ability
C She leaves physical science
D She forgets her knowledge

What does the zombie argument aim to challenge?

A Behaviorism about politics
B Dualism about memory
C Physicalism about consciousness
D Functionalism about language

Does conceivable zombie existence alone prove metaphysical possibility?

A Yes, it settles physicalism
B Yes, it proves dualism
C Zombies are impossible by definition
D No, that inference is disputed

What does Chalmers call easy problems?

A Explaining cognitive functions
B Explaining why experience feels
C Explaining personal identity
D Explaining political authority

What is a key issue for interactionist dualism?

A Explaining why bodies exist
B Explaining mental causal influence
C Explaining all language
D Explaining political behavior

What does Leibniz’s mill thought experiment question?

A Finding freedom in law
B Finding art in nature
C Finding perception in machinery
D Finding memory in language

What does Locke connect personal identity with?

A Sameness of material particles
B A permanent soul alone
C Public reputation
D Continuity of consciousness

What is Parfit’s psychological continuity view?

A Overlapping mental connections
B One unchanging soul
C The same body only
D A continuous legal record

What does the branching case challenge?

A Memory as a mental process
B Identity as one-to-one relation
C Brains as physical objects
D Behavior as observable

What is animalism about personal identity?

A We are memory collections
B We are immaterial minds
C We are human organisms
D We are social roles

What did Hume describe as a bundle?

A A body of laws
B A group of citizens
C A set of memories only
D Perceptions making up the self

What is a core question about other minds?

A Behavioral evidence for other minds
B Can brains be observed?
C Can people share language?
D Can actions have causes?

What does intrinsic intentionality mean?

A Meaning assigned by a user
B Content intrinsic to state
C Content stored in a book
D A rule for translating symbols

Why do epiphenomenalists face a challenge?

A Brains cannot be observed
B Thoughts lack all content
C Mental states seem causally relevant
D Bodies never move

What does global workspace theory propose?

A Consciousness as a separate substance
B Mind as a hidden soul
C Thought as pure behavior
D Conscious access through broad availability

What does higher-order theory require?

A A thought about another state
B A brain without experience
C A body without perception
D A thought without content

What does integrated information theory associate consciousness with?

A Language performance alone
B Integrated causal information
C Memory storage alone
D A single brain location

What does the hard problem ask beyond function?

A How neurons send signals
B How people report feelings
C Why experience accompanies processing
D How attention guides action

Which question remains unresolved in philosophy of mind?

A Whether minds use concepts?
B Whether brains exist?
C Whether people have memories?
D How consciousness fits physical nature?